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access to homes, schools, health facilities, etc.
is challenging and dangerous. Livelihoods
are also directly affected when small industries and farmlands are destroyed and littered
with ERW.
The military operations resulted in over
2,000 casualties in Gaza, 65 in Israel and
massive damage to infrastructure and civilian property in Gaza. 3 A review on structures by United Nations Operational Satellite
Applications Programme (UNOSAT) detailed that within the 327 sq km (126 sq mi)
of the Gaza strip, 6,761 structures were de-

Extent of ERW damage in the residential area in Beit Lahiya, Gaza.

stroyed, 3,565 were severely damaged and

All graphics courtesy of UNMAS.
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4,938 were moderately damaged. In addition, there were 7,473 craters recorded in ag-

rom 7 July to 26 August 2014, significant quantities
of explosive ordnance were used during hostilities

ricultural and non-urbanized areas.4

between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Gazan

Approximately 74 percent of the damage sustained was with-

armed groups. It is reported that approximately 72,000 items

in 3 km (1.8 mi) of the Armistice Line. Within this area multiple

of ordnance were fired and launched during this period.1 This

neighborhoods such as Shuja’iyya, Beit Hanoun, Khuza’a, etc.,

presented a significant risk for civilians and hampered hu-

were damaged to such an extent that the vast majority of struc-

manitarian and reconstruction operations. Many unexplod-

tures in these communities were completely destroyed.

ed aircraft bombs, tank projectiles, mortar shells and other
munitions from both sides of the conflict were reported in

Threat Defined

civilian areas. Based on a 10 percent fail rate, it was assumed

While the majority of ERW seen to date in Gaza is of con-

there are approximately 7,200 items of explosive remnants of

ventional type, there have been no reports of submunitions

war (ERW) in Gaza, including a significant number of air de-

or landmines used with the exception of anti-tank mines de-

livered bombs.2 The ERW contamination has interrupted the

ployed by combat engineers in the destruction of buildings.

lives of entire communities in Gaza, where simply gaining

Ground ordnance in the form of tank, artillery, cannon and

Damage Assessment Summary
Destroyed

Severely
Damaged

Moderately
Damaged

Total Structures
Affected

Crater Impact

North Gaza

1,253

761

1,000

3,014

1,702

Gaza City

1,963

1,127

1,378

4,468

1,765

Deir Al Balah
Khan Younis
Rafah
Total

809

406

683

1,898

553

1,749

898

1,379

4,026

1,549

987

373

498

1,858

1,604

6,761

3,565

4,938

16,264

7,473

Figure 1. Damage assessment summary.
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technical advisors to work directly with the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and
other U.N. agencies. The UNMAS team was based
in the UNRWA compound during the conflict and
was responsible for carrying out ERW risk assessments at U.N. facilities and other structures. This
was to ensure that U.N. personnel and civilians
seeking refuge in U.N. premises were safe from
ERW and other explosive hazards. During the
emergency response, UNMAS Gaza carried out
214 ERW risk assessments on facilities of which
209 were cleared and five were handed back to the
parent organization to be included within the re-

UNRWA classroom in Biet Hanoon.

construction phase. As a result, UNRWA was in a
position to reopen all schools on their scheduled
date, thereby enabling 240,000 children to resume
their academic curriculum in a safe environment
free from ERW. The UNMAS emergency response
phase was critical to address immediate ERW and
other explosive threats to the U.N., as well as responding to the critical humanitarian needs of the
general civilian population.

Destroyed residential area of Shejaayea.

This deployment was vital in facilitating an
ERW response during the early stages of the conf lict. The immediate ERW threats to the civilian population were addressed and requirements
for a long-term ERW response were determined
through a defined needs assessment. The assessment included the identification and analysis of
the ERW threat, identifying those affected by the
threat, as well as the extent and measurable effects caused by the threat. The approach was “bottom-up” whereby all community stakeholders and
beneficiaries were consulted prior to any program
development, thereby identifying potential barri-

Removal of a neutralized 2000 lb bomb at the Rafah border crossing.

ers early. The results of the needs assessment were
formalized within the UNMAS Gaza concept of

recoilless projectiles, mortar bombs, grenades, and rockets

operations (CONOPS).

all exist. In addition, there is the threat from air delivered

Overview of ERW Risk Assessment

ordnance of up to 2,000 lb (907 kg) bombs and the toxicological hazard associated with fired-depleted uranium, armorpiercing projectiles.

Generic risk assessment is a multi-disciplinary approach
used by many organizations and industries for hazard identification, accident prevention and mitigation. It consists of an
objective evaluation of hazards and risks in which supposi-

UNMAS Gaza Emergency Response
On 27 July 2014, in response to a directive from the U.N.
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tions and fears are measured, analyzed and presented so that
a decision can be made concerning a course of action.

Secretary General, the United Nations Mine Action Service

Within the context of the UNMAS Gaza emergency re-

(UNMAS) deployed three explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

sponse, a hazard was defined as any item of ERW that could
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cause harm, whereas a risk was defined as the chance that

• Information analysis

somebody could be harmed by an ERW hazard. Therefore

• Report production

the ERW risk assessment was an invaluable process that de-

• Information dissemination

termined how the ERW hazards were defined and how they

• Process evaluation

affected planning and operations. A conscious decision was
made to ensure that the processes should always work toward

The phases flow in a continuous cycle creating a system
that is self-improving and adaptable to most situations.

producing useful information that can be assimilated practically into all levels of operations. The ERW risk assessment

ERW Risk Assessment Methodology

was a systematic and investigative process that involved iden-

Conducting ERW risk assessments within the context of

tifying hazards, predicting possible incidents, and determin-

the Gaza armed conflict, whether during the conflict or im-

ing the impact of hazards and mitigation measures that can be

mediately after the cessation of hostilities, was challenging

implemented or planned.

due to the specific facets that had to be considered. These facets included security, access, logistics, neutrality, and access

Principles of ERW Risk Assessment

to locations and information sources. Particularly challeng-

The ERW risk assessments were conducted in a con-

ing during the ERW risk assessments was the ever-changing

stantly changing environment due to the f luid nature of the

security situation that could change from a workable, condu-

conf lict in Gaza. From an operational management per-

cive environment to one of heightened danger in a short peri-

spective, the following core principles guided our principle-

od of time. In an attempt to mitigate the security threat whilst

based approach:

conducting ERW risk assessments, a very specific security risk

• The protection of human life—conducting ERW risk as-

management plan through an ERW Security CONOPS was

sessments inevitably exposed individuals to a high level

defined and implemented with the UNRWA field security of-

of risk; therefore, all exposure was preemptive and de-

fice (FSO), which included:

liberate where possible, with all mitigation measures in

• Casualty Evacuation procedures

place.

• Contingency plans

• The adoption of a holistic view—ensuring that the ERW

• Coordination mechanisms

risk assessments were viewed as an integrated system

• Escort arrangements

with several interconnecting components, all of which

• Identification of safe havens

needed to be analyzed in order to determine the threat

• Route assessment and planning

or hazard.

• Security measures

• The adoption of an investigative mindset—knowing the

• Security risk assessment matrix

mission, method and means of the conflict often revealed

As the purpose of the ERW risk assessment was to iden-

the most probable type and extent of ERW contamina-

tify hazards and risks, this methodology was chosen through

tion likely to be encountered. However, the importance

a fact-building questionnaire within an ERW risk assessment

of remaining open-minded was emphasized, as it can

report. This methodology was chosen because it provides a

lessen the risks of making premature decisions and de-

systematic way of evaluating situations, ascertaining threats,

veloping personal biases.

collecting and analyzing information, and reporting pertinent

• The dissemination of detailed and practical find-

facts and results to the client.

ings ensured that mitigation measures could be ef-

On completion of the ERW risk assessment report, all de-

fectively implemented and monitored with minimal

tails were forwarded to the requesting agency along with de-

disruption.

tails of any recommended risk-mitigation measures.

Phases of ERW Risk Assessment

ERW Risk Assessment Results Analysis

In order to develop a comprehensive, reliable and consis-

The following section is an analysis of the collat-

tent ERW risk assessment system, the following six-phased

ed ERW risk assessment resulting from the 214 facili-

approach was adopted for all ERW risk assessment activities,

ties visited. The actual analysis was a two-stage process

regardless of requesting agency or facility type:

where the data was identified and organized into the pre-

• Task planning

selected tables and then interpreted to gain a better un-

• Risk assessment

derstanding of the facts.
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UNRWA
Schools

UNRWA
Clinics

UNWRA
Other

UNDP

UNICEF
Schools

UNSCO

WHO
Hospitals

UNESCO
Education

NGO
Education

Total

ERW RA
Requests

100

12

34

15

26

3

9

14

1

214

ERW RA
Completions

100

12

34

15

26

3

9

14

1

214

Figure 2. ERW risk assessment by agency.

RA’s

A/C
Bomb

155 mm
Illum

155 mm
HE

120 mm
Tank
HEAT

120 mm
HE
Mortar

105 mm
Tank
HEAT

80 mm
HE
Mortar

Mine

Grenade

Guided
Missiles

Total

UNRWA
Schools

100

0

30

0

32

6

41

0

0

1

7

117

UNRWA
Clinics

12

0

1

0

0

0

5

0

0

0

0

6

UNRWA
Other

34

1

3

0

4

0

1

0

0

0

0

9

UNDP

15

5

10

0

20

1

11

5

0

0

0

52

UNICEF
Schools

26

9

37

0

68

13

5

0

1

0

0

133

UNSCO

3

0

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

6

WHO
Hospitals

9

0

1

0

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

UNESCO
Education

14

7

0

0

23

0

10

0

0

0

1

41

NGO
Education

1

0

5

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

10

214

22

93

5

153

20

73

5

1

1

8

381

Agency

Total

Figure 3. ERW designation types.

Requesting Agency Type
The following summarizes which agencies requested
ERW risk assessments:
• A total number of 214 ERW risk assessment requests

schools were assessed by UNMAS Gaza because the
Civil Protection Police (CPP) EOD teams conducted the
majority of ERW risk assessments at the request of the
Ministry of Education.

were received and completed giving a 100 percent response rate.

A total number of 381 items of ERW (or component

assessment requests, with the majority of ERW risk as-

parts) were located and cleared with the assistance of the

sessment requests originating from UNRWA (146), fol-

CPP EOD teams.

lowed by UNICEF (26); United Nations Development

• The highest proportion of ERW type cleared was the 105

Programme (15); and United Nations Educational,

mm and 120 mm high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) mu-

Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (14).

nitions, with 59 percent recorded. This ammunition is

• Educational facilities comprised 65 percent of the

associated with the two main variants of the Merkeva

ERW risk assessment requests, while medical facilities

main battle tank. These HEAT munitions were alleg-

comprised 10 percent.

edly used to reduce collateral damage, as the munitions

• Although it was openly stated during all humanitarian
meetings attended by UNMAS Gaza during the emer-

contain directional charges (as opposed to being omnidirectional) and have considerably less explosives.6

gency response phase that UNMAS was available to

• For 60 percent of the 93 assessments where 155 mm il-

help, UNMAS received only one request for an ERW

luminating artillery ammunition was cleared, the muni-

risk assessment from an NGO.

tion consisted of an empty illuminating projectile casing.

• A relatively low number of UNICEF-supported
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ERW Designation Type

• U.N. agencies accounted for 99 percent of the ERW risk
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It should be noted, however, that substantial damage was

sustained to many facilities due to the free falling casings,
including one that entered the roof and exited the floor
pan of a U.N. Special Coordinator’s Office (UNSCO) B6
armored land-cruiser.
• In all assessments of guided missile use, the component
parts recovered were thought to be those of Hellfire guided missiles.

Evidence of Military Occupation
Evidence of military occupation is presented in the following narrative and in Figure 5:
• Only eight percent of ERW risk assessments saw evidence
of any military occupation.
• This eight percent was only evident in UNRWA Schools
and UNICEF-supported school facilities.

• The only recorded use of a mine was an M-15 anti-tank
mine that was used as a demolition charge to destroy a

Aerial Bomb Clearance

mosque adjacent to a Palestine Authority (PA) school;

• During the UNMAS Gaza emergency response, a total of

the mine only partially detonated with the remnants be-

118 aerial bombs were destroyed with 16 neutralized by

ing thrown into the school grounds.

UNMAS Gaza prior to final disposal by detonation. The

• All aerial bomb component parts matched that of the

Ministry of Interior realized that not all EOD tasks can

MK-80 series, low-drag, general-purpose aerial bomb.

be undertaken by the CPP EOD teams due to limitations

• The only hand grenade recovered was an M26 hand gre-

in their technical knowledge base and therefore request-

nade that was cleared following a family dispute at an
UNRWA school, which was being used as a camp for internally displaced persons.

ed UNMAS to render-safe the bomb fuzes.
• Conducting major EOD clearance- tasks within the
post-conflict Gaza environment was and still is ex-

• All ERW items cleared, with the exception of the hand

tremely complex due to the differing interlocutors that

grenade and 120 mm mortars, originated from the IDF

must be considered and consulted. It is of paramount

or the Israeli Air Force (IAF).
Agency

RA’s

Direct
Fire

Indirect
Fire

Total

UNRWA Schools

100

25

42

67

UNRWA Clinics

12

1

7

8

UNRWA Other

34

13

14

27

some degree of structural damage whether through di-

UNDP

15

6

2

8

rect fire or indirect fire, with 30 percent receiving no

UNICEF Schools

26

13

6

19

structural damage.7,8

UNSCO

3

1

0

1

WHO Hospitals

9

2

4

6

cilities that received structural damage through indirect

UNESCO Education

14

8

5

13

fire (53 percent) than direct fire (47 percent).

NGO Education

1

1

0

1

214

70

80

150

Structural Damage
Figure 4 provides analysis on the sustained structural
damage:
• Of all facilities that were assessed, 70 percent received

• There was a higher proportion of ERW risk assessed fa-

• Of the UNESCO facilities that were assessed, 92 percent were found to have sustained structural damage
from either direct fire or indirect fire, with 73 percent of

Total

Figure 4. Structural damage analysis.

UNICEF-supported PA schools having sustained some
level of damage.
• The damage ranged from Small Arms Ammunition
(SAA) impact strikes to the total destruction of buildings
and facilities by the use of aerial bombs.
• In addition to damage sustained from direct fire or indirect fire, some facilities also had direct damage from IAF
armored bulldozers; this is especially the case for facilities located to the east of the Salah Ed Deen main arterial route.
• The one NGO facility, a children’s nursery, was completely destroyed by tank projectiles, artillery projectiles, aerial bombs and armored bulldozers.

Agency
UNRWA Schools

RA’s

IDF

Armed
Groups

Total

100

4

7

11

UNRWA Clinics

12

0

0

0

UNRWA Other

34

0

0

0

UNDP

15

0

0

0

UNICEF Schools

26

5

0

5

UNSCO

3

0

0

0

WHO Hospitals

9

0

0

0

UNESCO Education

14

0

0

0

NGO Education

1

0

0

0

214

9

7

16

Total

Figure 5. Evidence of military occupation.
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importance that for any major EOD operation, prior ap-

was agreed upon, documented, applied and reviewed. The de-

proval must be gained from the Ministry of Interior, the

fined ERW risk assessment methodology has been modified

UNRWA director and the UNMAS director, and all rel-

to suit the specific nuances of other ERW risk assessments

evant information must be presented to the Coordinator

within a phased response. Initially, the ERW risk assessment

of Government Activities in the Territories Unit in the

procedure was defined for the UNMAS emergency response

Coordination and Liaison Administration for Gaza.

phase and now has been modified for the UNMAS ERW reconstruction support phase.

Aerial Bomb and Fuze Technical Analysis
A technical analysis on the 16 aerial bombs rendered safe
including the following:
• All of the aerial bombs and 67 percent of the fuzes were of
NATO origin and manufacture.
• Small diameter bombs accounted for 31 percent of the
aerial bombs rendered safe; low drag general purpose
bombs accounted for the remaining 69 percent.

The analysis of the ERW risk assessments from the 214 facilities visited was based on a relatively small sample number when looking at the quantities of explosive ordnance used
and the damage and destruction within the wider context of
the 2014 conflict. While in-depth, valid information was obtained, it should not be viewed as an exact representation of
the situation Gaza-wide.
It should be noted that when managing the recovered data,

• The 1000 lb aerial bomb was the most common aerial

a conscious effort was made to present “real impartial data”

bomb type rendered safe, accounting for 43 percent of

as opposed to unsubstantiated anecdotes. The data was sim-

aerial bombs.

ply presented in an unbiased manner with the intention of de-

• An electronic multi-functioning aerial bomb fuze was
the most common fuze type rendered safe, accounting
for 38 percent of aerial bombs.

termining useful information and formulating conclusions to
assist in the technical decision making process.
Collectively, the UNMAS emergency response findings

• During the render-safe operation, stuck-fast fuzes oc-

and the results from the ERW response needs assessment pro-

curred in 25 percent of cases. With these aerial bombs,

vided the prerequisite information needed to accurately de-

there was a medium degree of bomb body deformation

fine the future UNMAS Gaza CONOPS. This has and will

through the initial impact with the target. This would

continue to ensure that appropriate technical assets and sup-

have caused movement of the internal components with-

port mechanisms are in place for each operational phase,

in the aerial bomb, potentially leading to misfires and 31

thereby ensuring that UNMAS continues to meet and exceed

percent of the aerial bomb fuzes had armed and partially

the expectations of all stakeholders involved.
See endnotes page 66

functioned, but the detonating wave was not transferred
into the booster element.
• In aerial bombs where both nose and tail fuzes could be
fitted, only tail fuzes were used with inert aerodynamic

Mark Frankish

plugs fitted in the nose cavity.

Ammunition & Weapon Management Advisor
UNMAS Gaza
1 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017 / USA
Website: www.mineaction.org

Summary
Ensuring the safety of staff during operations was of paramount importance and required that UNMAS Gaza effectively manage the ever-changing security situation through
the creation and implementation of a specific security risk
management system. This was only possible through the close
coordination and facilitation of the UNRWA FSO, who was
fundamental in the management of the security enabling environment.
Conducting ERW risk assessments was and is a sensitive
and delicate process, as it deals with how hazards and risks are
perceived and managed. In order to eliminate any personal
bias during the ERW risk assessment procedure, it was vital
that a formal and systematic ERW risk assessment procedure
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